

SUNY series on Sport, Culture, and Social Relations
CL Cole and Michael A. Messner, editors

National Identity
— and
Global Sports Events

*Culture, Politics, and Spectacle
in the Olympics and the
Football World Cup*



Edited by
Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young

State University of New York Press

Contents

vii	Acknowledgments	
1	Chapter 1	Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Global Sports Event—An Introduction Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young
15	Chapter 2	The Theory of Spectacle: Reviewing Olympic Ethnography John J. MacAloon
41	Chapter 3	Italy 1934: Football and Fascism Robert S. C. Gordon and John London
65	Chapter 4	Berlin 1936: The Most Controversial Olympics Allen Guttmann
83	Chapter 5	England 1966: Traditional and Modern? Tony Mason
99	Chapter 6	Mexico City 1968: Sombreros and Skyscrapers Claire and Keith Brewster
117	Chapter 7	Munich 1972: Re-presenting the Nation Christopher Young

Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2006 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State University of New York Press,
194 Washington Avenue, Suite 305, Albany, NY 12210-2384

Production by Michael Haggert
Marketing by Michael Campocharo

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

National identity and global sports events / culture, politics, and spectacle in the Olympics and the football World Cup / edited by Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young. p. cm. — (SUNY series on sport, culture, and social relations)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-7914-6615-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Nationalism and sports—History. 2. Sports and globalization—History. 3. Sports—Sociological aspects—Cross-cultural studies. I. Tomlinson, Alan. II. Young, Christopher, 1967– III. Series.

GV706 .J4.N38 2005

306.4'83—dc22

2004029962

ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6615-5 (hardcover : alk. paper)

10987654321

Chapter 3

Italy 1934

Football and Fascism

Robert S. C. Gordon and John London

INTRODUCTION: A DECADE OF SPORTING GLORY

The second football World Cup took place in Italy between May 27 and June 10, 1934. Thirty-two teams, including Italy, entered the qualifiers. For the tournament proper, sixteen teams took part, playing seventeen matches (the odd number caused by a replay of the quarter-final between Italy and Spain) in eight different venues (Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Rome, Trieste, and Turin). Nearly 400,000 tickets were sold, making for a respectable, but not massive, average attendance of over 23,000 per match. The final, between Italy and Czechoslovakia, was held in the Stadio Flaminio or Fascist National Party Stadium in Rome on June 10. Italy won by two goals to one, after extra time (Inglis 1990, 9; Glanville 1980, 23–42).

The 1934 home victory was one of the high points in an astonishing sequence of successes for Italian football in the 1930s, only challenged in the history of the game by the modern Brazilian teams. Italy won a European football tournament played over the three-year period, 1927–1930. After 1934, it went on to win the Olympic football title in Berlin in 1936 (with a team of student amateurs) and then, against the odds and hostile crowds, to retain its World Cup title in France in 1938. Italy also fought the aloof masters of the game, England, in three highly symbolic friendlies in 1933, 1934, and 1939. The middle of these, the “Battle of Highbury” of November 1934, took on near mythic status in Italian collective memory, as the Italians, playing with ten men for eighty minutes, fought back heroically from 3–0 down to 3–2, with only a whisker denying them an equalizer at the death (Beck 2001). For this entire period, the national team was coached by the extraordinary figure of Vittorio Pozzo, former crack *ardito* soldier in the Great War, father figure, and authoritarian: in nearly a

decade in charge (1930-1938), his record reads: played 62; won 45; drew 11; lost 6 (Fabrizio 1976, 62; Foot 2006).

Italian clubs also enjoyed signal success in this period, especially the Bologna team, which won the Mitropa (Central European) Cup in 1932 and 1934 and then beat Chelsea in the Paris Exhibition Tournament in 1937 (Lanfranchi 1991). And football was far from being the only sport at which Italy excelled: the Italian team came second to the home U.S. team in the medals table at the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics; Tazio Nuvolari cut a dash around the grand prix circuits and the Mille Miglia race between 1930 and 1935; Italo Balbo flew across the Atlantic to Brazil in 1931 and Chicago in 1933; and Gino Bartali won the Tour de France in 1938 (McCarthy 2000).

Such successes were presented and perceived, nationally and internationally, as victories, not merely for Italy but more particularly for the Fascist regime (1922-1943). When Primo Carneera became World Heavyweight Boxing Champion, in 1933, Mussolini and Carneera swapped telegrams after his victory, the latter claiming: "My victory was for Italy and for the Duce" (Valentini 2002, 32). Carneera was flown home, fêted and decked out in a black shirt. The Italian team at Los Angeles was nicknamed the "Mussolini boys." The Bologna team was very much the plaything of influential local Fascist *rs* (or chief), Leandro Arpinati, Jules Rimet himself could not contain his astonishment at what he took to be the root cause of Italy's triumph in the World Cup, Fascism, "a faith able to perform such miracles" (Chirelli 1990, 133).

The 1934 World Cup thus appears to be part of an image of Italian sporting prowess encouraged and manipulated by the Fascist regime. It can be seen to anticipate the Nazi achievement of the Berlin Olympics two years later. Indeed, chroniclers of the World Cup concur in describing how the Italians exploited the words of one account, the competition "revertebrate" to the hideous strains of a growing, pervasive Fascist ideology" (Shirley and Wight, 2002, 11). Closer to the final result, there were failures as well as successes. To assess the nature of the Fascist impact on this early, international sporting event, it is first necessary to analyze the development and realization of notions of sport under Mussolini's regime before moving on to examine the tournament itself.

FASCIST IDEOLOGY, THE "NEW MAN" AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SPORT

Although Fascism as an ideology has proved notoriously hard to define, certain persistent elements in its makeup drew it ineluctably toward sport from the outset, even if on occasion from contradictory directions. These elements

include its nationalism; its militarism; anti-individualism, and pedagogical-talitarianism; its aesthetics and culture of consent; and the myth of Mussolini. Fascism was a nationalist movement to its core and was constantly alert to means of exalting the nation, restoring the glory of the past (Roman Empire, Renaissance Italy), acquiring the modern trappings of international power (Empire) and emulating the status of rivals in Europe. Sport would come to play a key role in the promotion of the nation's glory abroad, especially in the 1930s. International sport as an arm of diplomacy was beginning to take root throughout Europe in this decade (Teja 1998), and Fascist Italy was alert to its potential. Hence in the 1939 Italy-England game in Milan, weeks before war, the English team's Fascist salute was perceived as a key propaganda coup. Conversely, Italy pulled out of both the 1936 Tour de France and a 1937 football match in France on Mussolini's orders, to signal his hostility to Léon Blum's government, only to return and win the World Cup in Paris in 1938, weeks after the Nazi Anschluss (Murray 1994, 96-101).

Meanwhile, within Italy itself, the prime task of the totalitarian nation was the training of the population to breed and educate fighting soldiers. Both Nazism and Fascism inherited this idea from Victorian and Prussian notions of the education of the body (Pivato 1994). A huge program of mass participation in sporting activity, run under the auspices of the wdb of Fascist child, youth, and student organizations, came into being in the 1920s to sustain this form of education in Italy. The militaristic principle also nourished the Fascist subordination of the individual to the corporate body of the state, achieved through a regimented conformist culture of the uniform, the group (modeled on the army unit and trained to move as one), and public spectacle at mass parades and, on occasion, sporting events.

The promotion of these concepts in an ultranationalist framework was achieved through legislative change and the subsequent formation of new Fascist organizations. Institutional reform occurred on several levels from 1922, and especially after 1925. Fascism reformed physical education in schools (part of the important Gentile reforms of the school system launched in 1923) and transformed sporting institutions (the CONI [Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano], IOC, and FIGC [Federazione Italiana Ginnoco del Calcio]) into organs of the Fascist Party and state, dominated by a series of high-ranking party officials, either from the party leadership itself or from the increasingly influential propaganda unit, the Ufficio Stampa, as if to emphasize the importance of this area of policy. Fascism then used those institutions to restructure the organization of sport, most fundamentally with the Carta di Viareggio (1926) for football, which regularized the status of clubs and players, Italianized the language of this Anglo-Saxon sport (Inter became Ambrosiana; Milan Milano, for example), and paved the way for the first national league, launched in 1929, and the Carta dello Sport (December 30, 1928), which regulated all sports from the elite down to the mass level.

Great importance was attached to the sporting aspects of the immense youth and after-work organizations, the Balilla (or ONB, Opera Nazionale Balilla) and the Dopolavoro (or OND, Opera nazionale Dopolavoro), launched in 1925 and 1926, respectively (De Grazia 1981). Around the OND and ONB, local, regional, and national competitive and collective display games were set in place in the 1930s (such as the *littoriali*), and, at ground level, most sections included some form of sporting activity and/or spectatorship as part of a wide range of programs offered. By 1936, the ONB had 5,500,000 members; by 1937, the OND had almost 20,000 local sporting associations and organized 130,000 tournaments or meets (although over half of these were bowls matches), involving tens of millions of players and spectators (Pivato 1994, 101). A mass culture of sport was, then, truly established and rooted in Italy, even if concentrated in the center and north of the country and among men rather than women (Dogliani 2000).

From the lowest to the highest levels, the Fascist regime also invested heavily—using tax breaks, subsidies, programs of public construction, and the input of local figures of influence—in sporting infrastructure. By 1930, over 2,000 new local stadia or tracks had been built (500 new stadia were inaugurated simultaneously on one day in 1929), and eighty-three out of a total of ninety-four official provincial centers in Italy had their own regional sports grounds (Pennacchia 1999, vol. 1, 160; Martin 2004, 79–171; Rossi 2002). This capillary infrastructural program had a direct impact on the 1934 World Cup: a series of major architectural projects between 1926 and 1933 led to the construction or modernization of all the stadia used as venues in the tournament (1926, Stadio San Siro, Milan; 1927, Stadio Littoriale, Bologna; 1928, Stadio Flaminio/PNF, Rome; 1930, Stadio Ascarelli, Naples; 1932, Stadio Littorio, Trieste; 1932, Stadio G. Berta, Florence; 1933, Stadio L. Ferraris, Genoa; 1933, Stadio B. Mussolini, Turin). The Bologna and the Florence stadia are commonly taken as the most interesting and telling as innovative Fascist architecture, employing styles both modern (concrete and glass materials in nontraditional forms) and neo-classical (Marathon Towers, porticos, friezes, and sculptures) (Inglis 1990, 10–57).

Much of the mass participation in sporting activity mentioned was low level, often non-competitive, and formed by an aesthetics of display as much as by the virtues of physical exertion (e.g., gymnastics); and for this reason it was able to perform a second, perhaps more immediately effective function beyond its long-term prospect as a primary trainer for the military. Sport also became a form of mass leisure and thus a manufacturer of consent (Cannistraro 1975), although there was an inevitable conceptual tension between the active participant and the passive spectator. Furthermore, the idea of mass leisure was at odds with the notion of an individual sporting hero. Two contrasting and even contradictory principles underlay the nationalist and militarist impulses within Fascist

sport: the harmonized, non-competitive, and homogenizing principle symbolized by mass gymnastics, and the competitive, aggressive heroism epitomized in sportsmen such as Carnera or Pozzo's star player, Giuseppe Meazza. Within the Fascist conception of the body and the individual there was a possible way out of this contradiction: even the gymnasts were ultimately intended as sub-units of mass aggression in war, and the sporting heroes were not so much heroes qua individuals as embodiments of a core Fascist myth, that of the "New Man," the perfected Fascist individual wholly imbued, in body and in spirit, with a near-mystical devotion to the state. Of course, the highest exemplar of the Fascist New Man was Mussolini himself, who literally embodied the state and was ever depicted as the fighting and sporting hero in his own right, his body frequently on display as physical worker, soldier, pilot, rider, skier, fencer, runner, and swimmer (although rarely, if ever as footballer) (Gori 2000; Mosse 1996).

Several key characteristics of the New Man were echoed in the so-called "metodo" of Pozzo's team: youth (Malvano 1984), love of risk and danger, sacrifice to the nation's cause, and pride in the nation (and, increasingly, in the race). Football's individual heroism in a collective, team cause was in harmony with such forces; and even the crowd attending matches could be seen to represent an ideal, choral collectivity coming together in a single, viscerally felt, faith and cause, much like Fascism itself (Fabrizio 1976, 52). As a radio broadcast just before the start of the 1934 World Cup put it: "Italian crowds will certainly recognize in each athlete the representative of that virtue that twelve years of Fascism have distilled in the collective soul and which is called 'self-esteem' or 'being aware of one's own worth'" (CONI 1936, 49).

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The press was the first medium to exploit sport to the full and the first to exploit the new category (and spending power) of the fan (Panico and Papa 1993, 121–32). *Gazzetta dello Sport*, founded in 1896, came out daily from 1913 and *Il Guerin Sportivo* weekly from 1912. Newspapers began offering daily sports coverage in the 1920s (*Il Popolo d'Italia* from 1923; *Corriere della Sera* from 1927), a crucial stage in sport's infiltration of daily life outside sport (Lanfranchi 1991, 340). Magazines proliferated, including several illustrated ones, such as *Calcio Illustrato*, and Fascist titles such as *Il Littoriale* (from 1927) or *Lo Sport Fascista* (from 1928). To a greater or lesser extent, all adopted the rhetorical, epic style in tune with Fascist public pronouncements (Brera 1975, 77–83; Fabrizio 1976, 149–65). The national press also made efforts to use printed images to enhance its coverage. For the World Cup, between 275 and 400 foreign journalists from twenty-nine countries (the sources disagree) were accredited at

the competition (CONI 1936, 57; Murray 1994, 87–93; Panico and Papa 1993, 190), and they found a coordinating press center with regular press conferences in central Rome (Recanatelli 1978, 23–24).

The regime only began to invest heavily in the power of radio from the early 1930s—Mussolini's brother, Arnaldo, ran the state radio company, EIAIR (Ente Italiano Radiofoniche) from 1930—and radio ownership was relatively low compared to other European countries. By 1932, 340,000 licenses had been issued, compared to 4 million in Germany (Richeri 1980, 52), rising to 535,000 in 1935, but collective listening in public places was commonplace, especially for certain key types of broadcasts, from major national events to football matches (Forgas 1990, 63–68). Many sets were owned by organizations such as the OND and schools, as well as, increasingly, bars and cafes. To gauge the maximum reach of collective listening, it is estimated that Mussolini's famous speech declaring his imperial war on Abyssinia on October 2, 1935, drew approximately 10 million listeners (Richeri 1980, 55). Sports broadcasting—featuring, especially, football and cycling—was a staple in both news and live commentary, although it is worth noting that it was not hugely prominent in the scheduling, nor the most popular item: only half of the listening population—probably the male half—listened regularly, compared to 95 percent for news and 80 to 85 percent for entertainment, according to a 1939 questionnaire (Monticone 1978, 66–69).

From 1930, the second half of a league match was broadcast live every week, followed by the list of league results, and it swiftly became a public ritual (Panico and Papa 1993, 206).

The rapid acceleration of state initiatives in radio, from the early 1930s, coincided with the build-up to the World Cup, and the role of radio in football was immeasurably enhanced following the debut in 1933 (for a match between Italy and Germany) of legendary commentator Nicolo Carosio, whose florid, creative, and decidedly non-technical broadcasts—Gianni Brera described him as the “unrivaled Homer of a footballing epic” (Brera 1975, 133–34)—would be for decades at the heart of the collective memory of Italian football. Radio sales saw a spurt for the World Cup (Recanatelli 1978, 26) and, for the first time, radio rights were sold internationally: Holland bought exclusive rights, and between nine and fifteen other countries (assessments differ according to sources) took feeds of commentaries in four different languages set up by radio company EIAIR, from the quarter finals onward (Vigarello 1990, 10; Panico and Papa 1993, 190).

A parallel story can be told of the Fascist state's investment in newsreels and the position of sport within them. The Istituto LUCE (L'Unione Cinematografica Educativa), founded in 1924, began producing over 100 newsreels a year in 1927, and these were a compulsory part of any cinema screening (Argentieri 1979). This latter point is crucial, since Italians spent far more of their leisure time and money on cinema than they did on sports events—by a

ratio of 14 to 1, according to a survey of spending carried out in 1938 (Rossi 2002). All newsreels were previewed by Mussolini himself (Wagstaff 1984, 163–64). Sporting events, whether competitive matches or organized displays, were a stock feature of the newsreels, typically included alongside items of local interest and state ceremonies, as frames for the more tightly news-driven and international segments (Manzini 1985, 121–68; Argentieri 1979). The Istituto LUCE also produced more extended documentary pieces, on a variety of topics, but again, sporting prowess featured here. For the World Cup itself, over 15,000 meters of film were shot (Panico and Papa 1993, 205). As with several other areas under Fascist state management, the period 1933–1935 showed a marked acceleration in control and aggressive propagandizing in newsreels (evinced, for example, in the use of the Fascist calendar in newsreels from 1934), coinciding with the period of the World Cup. In the same year the Fascist salute became a compulsory prelude to all football matches, thus giving an added visual impact to Fascist symbolism.

THE POLITICS, RHETORIC, AND REALITY OF THE WORLD CUP

The World Cup was not the first international sporting competition to be hosted by Fascist Italy. The International University Games were successfully staged in Rome in 1928 and Turin in 1933. (The second event especially was an excuse for much boasting about the achievements of the regime: see Tomlinson 2005, 54–55.) A campaign was launched in 1930 to secure the 1936 Olympics in Rome (which lost out to Berlin). After informal assurances in 1930, at a 1932 meeting of FIFA in Stockholm (and then Zurich), Italy did succeed in securing the 1934 football World Cup, due to the dynamic negotiation of the international secretary of the Italian Football Federation, Giovanni Mauro. Mauro had carefully orchestrated the campaign to claim the hosting of the tournament, backed up by government guarantees to underwrite any losses, a crucial prerequisite for the staging of the modern global sporting event (Ormezzano and Colombero 1978, 22).

Given that Achille Starace, the longest-running Fascist Party secretary (1931–1939), was the figurehead for the 1934 World Cup, one would expect a high degree of fascistization in the presentation of the competition. It was Starace who did the most to proliferate uniforms and parades and to promote the Fascist (or Roman) salute in Italian society. He was, in the words of one historian, “the high priest of the cult of the Duce” (Gentile 1984, 264). In fact, the functioning of the tournament involved disguising to a certain degree the Fascist potential of the event and its iconography, while simultaneously attempting to present a Fascist image of it to an Italian public.

Take the promotion of the tournament through visual material. In all, 100,000 posters, 300,000 postcards, and 1 million stamps were put into circulation to commemorate the occasion. There was even a new cigarette brand called "Campionato del mondo" (World Championship) (Valentini 2002, 36). As part of the open collectivity, national competitions had been launched, such as that for the design of the tournament posters and other publicity material. It could be argued that designs of a typically Fascist-modernist style were chosen as winners (Vigarelli 1990, 9–10; Ormezzano and Colombero, 1978, 170–71; Pinkus 1995). However, the use of the winning entries is telling (Figure 3.1). Luigi Martinati's image of the football with the world in the background seems to emanate from an abstracted form of the *fascio littorio* in the bottom left-hand corner, the rods tied to an axe that was at the heart of the etymology of Fascism and had, in 1926, been officially adopted as the symbol of the Fascist state (Falasca-Zamponi 1997, 95–99). Mario Gros's footballer is giving the Fascist salute. In contrast, Gino Boccasile's player is about to kick a ball, and while the image shares the modernist sans-serif lettering of the other winners, the flags convey the international nature of the competition. Although Martinati's design won first prize, it was Boccasile's design, the one with no overt Fascist symbolism, that became the most familiar and lasting image of the competition, since it was used on the cover of the official tournament program. Moreover, even Boccasile's image had been transformed: in the original, published in 1933, a small *fascio littorio* had been present in the bottom right-hand corner, there had been no translations—eventually, on the left-hand side—and "Italia" had followed the main lettering indicating the world championship (Pennacchia 1999, vol. 1, 168). In this sense, extreme nationalism was visually subsumed into an internationalist stance.



FIGURE 3.1 The final form of three of the winning entries in the design competition for the 1934 World Cup. The artists, from left to right, are Gino Boccasile, Mario Gros, and Luigi Martinati. Source: Private collection.

A similar lack of uniformity can be observed when the rhetoric of the reporting is compared to what was happening during the matches. It is not difficult to find examples of propagandists wanting to connect the victory of the team to the glory of the nation:

It is an event which acquires greater importance if it is considered as one of so many expressions of national will set on securing for our Country a position of supremacy in each field of human activity, especially in those chiefly dominated by effort and individual risk and the spirit of organization and collective discipline. (Volontà di primato 1934, 1)

The national glory was in turn related to Mussolini's role. "The Duce's congratulations for the great success of the Italian players" ran one headline to an article assessing the competition (De Martino 1934e, 4). The newspaper founded by Mussolini, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, proudly declared in its headline: "In the name and in the presence of the Duce, the *azzurri* [as the national team was known] win a new world title." The same journalist, Luigi Freddi—a veteran Fascist and a key figure in the press and cinema of the regime—went on to reinforce the link by quoting his master: "We have seen the *azzurri* continuously apply the teaching of the Duce, who wants to make out of our people a 'methodical, tenacious, and persevering' race (*razza*)" (Freddi 1934f, 8).

In practice, the Duce's presence at the games did not imply consistent support. He attended a qualifying match between the United States and Mexico (4–2) and the first game played by Italy in the competition in which it thrashed the United States 7–1 in Rome. He was present to receive personal applause at the final, yet he had sent his sons to the replay between Italy and Spain in Florence (1–0) and did not attend the Italy versus Austria semi-final (1–0), preferring to stay in Rome to see the other semi-final in which Czechoslovakia beat Germany 3–1. Despite accusations of match fixing that favored Italy, one can but wonder how the regime would have dealt with the leader's absence at what could have been the national team's last match. An inkling is given by what actually occurred during the Czech–German semi-final: before the end of the match, news of Italy's victory against Austria was announced through loudspeakers to the spectators of the Stadio Flaminio in Rome. The result was to focus the Roman crowd on events in Milan: having heard the announcement, they stood up and turned toward where Mussolini was sitting, all the time applauding (Freddi 1934e, 8).

In order to highlight the intimate connection between the totalitarian state and sporting success, statements about control and discipline had to be transferred from their civil, pedagogical context to an international sporting event. A radio preview of the competition therefore stressed that the training of the *azzurri* had been "meticulously controlled by the hierarchs of the Italian Football

go, but I want in some way to be represented. So I ask you to buy a ticket and send a worker in my place" (De Martino 1934e, 4). The request was apparently fulfilled, and whatever the veracity of the incident, it painted a picture of nationwide, cross-class support, especially necessary for this event, since the center for the sport was still perceived as being in the north of the country, and the national team had played in Rome for the first time only six years before the World Cup, in 1928.

A more blatant problem was the discrepancy between expectations and outcome with regard to attendance at matches. Few of the games reached capacity figures, but hopes were high for the final. On the day before the match, June 9, Italian radio confidently announced that 70,000 people would go (CONI 1936, 62). *Il Giornale d'Italia* anticipated a crowd of over 60,000 (Lazotti 1934b, 1), but the headline in the same newspaper introducing the report about the match explained how "fifty thousand people applaud the Duce in the Stadium of the Party" (50,000 persone 1934, 1). Another Roman daily, *La Tribuna*, gave a detailed description of the stadium, pointing out how empty spaces could be seen. (In fact, the Milan semi-final, in which Italy defeated Austria, was more intensely followed and better attended; see Cante 1996). Anybody present at the final could have seen the gaps, many of which were at the curved end of the pitch, near the goal, on the side of the Viale Tiziano (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). *La Tribuna* argued that the sun and ticket prices had been responsible (Giottoli 1934d, 9), thereby raising, right at the end of the competition, a controversial point: to some degree, ticket prices were aimed as much at the relatively wealthy and the traveling fans as at home crowds, for whom the price in the "popular" terraces was a relatively expensive six lire, while the covered stands went up to sixty lire (Mannucci 2002, 38). An Italian factory worker could expect to earn between 300 and 400 lire per month in the 1930s (Milza 1999, 606). Perhaps it was the socio-political sensitivity to such causes that forced *Il Popolo d'Italia* into denying the truth: its report of the match boasted that an "immense crowd" had submerged every structure of the "immense stadium," so that the pitch was the only unoccupied area (Freddi 1934f, 8). This was mendacious on another account: as international observers were keenly aware, the Stadio Flaminio could hardly be called "immense," since it did not conform to international standards of size (Inglis 1990, 50).

Spectators were, however, measured not just by numbers. As a reflection of the regime's concern about the potential ideological contradiction between passive spectators and active participants, the two categories were consciously blurred. Spectators became active participants in the sporting struggle. Before the semi-finals, the radio was proclaiming that, in supporting the Italian players, spurring them on and making them proud, the public would be the "leading actor in tomorrow's encounter" (CONI 1936, 59). Italian fans were engaged in the same militaristic activity as their team, so they played their part

in the first battle against Spain: "The shouting of twenty thousand people hurls the *azzurri* into the attack" (Freddi 1934c, 8). By the end of the whole competition, congratulations were in order for Italian crowds who had participated "more often as actors than as spectators" and had shown through their behavior "a demonstration of ethical maturity second to none" (Freddi 1934f, 8). Their role was not simply to be active in relation to the players on the field, but to take part in something beyond the realm of sport. A radio broadcast on the day before the first games of the competition made this clear by pointing out that what was going to take place on the following day, "more than a spectacle of great proportions, is a ceremony of profound significance" (CONI 1936, 54). The journalistic depiction of the events just after the final elevated the experience to new heights: the joyful applause and the austere music of the Royal March "gave the characteristics of a religious rite to the consecratory ceremony of the success" (Giottoli 1934c, 1). Of course, this can simply be viewed as relabeling existing actions, and one can be cynical as to how many fans felt they were either actively or ritualistically involved. Nevertheless, it is relevant that such vocabulary should have been used in 1934, precisely the year in which fascist public ceremonies and rituals took on a more aggressive, militaristic cast (Berezin 1997, 116–19).




FIGURE 3.3 The final of the 1934 World Cup, played between Italy and Czechoslovakia. Clearly visible at this, the curved end of the stadium, are significant gaps in the crowd.
Source: Private collection.

Alongside this increasingly nationalist categorization, several events and theoretical plays combined to place Italians in a markedly internationalist context (just as we have seen the visual imagery fluctuate between the two extremes). The press quoted from the telegrams the Duce received from the competing countries at the beginning of the tournament, thus seeming to give his regime added legitimacy. General Vaccaro was proud to declare, in a florid, rhetorical style, that one of the decisions agreed at FIFAs Twenty-second Congress was to

multiply yet further on the . . . playing fields international contacts, striving to contribute, with our sensibility of sportsmen at the vanguard of every realistic ideal, to the tightening between Nations of those ties of respect and reciprocity whose moral value is in the conscience of each of us. (Freddi 1934a, 8)

Such goals would be achieved from the Italian standpoint with a mixture of arrogance and manipulative diplomacy. Foreign fans arrived from abroad in unprecedented numbers, by tens of thousands (7,000 from Holland, 10,000 each from Switzerland and Austria; see Vigarello 1990, 8), with special trains (including four from Czechoslovakia for the final alone) and tourist packages laid on to facilitate their journey. The new stadia were shown off to groups of international journalists as engineering and architectural triumphs. But an element of nationalism was introduced through geographical choice: matches were placed in cities of cultural and/or political prestige, or to make a political point—Trieste, for example, for Italy's on-going irredentist claims (Dogliani 2000, 334). Italy's first game of the tournament, against the United States, is a good illustration of the way Fascist diplomacy would function. Mussolini sat in the VIP stand with his sons, Bruno and Vittorio, members of the Italian royal family and the U.S. ambassador. The players from both teams gave the Fascist Party salute to the stand, and the Duce replied. Before the start of the game, the Americans gave the Italian team a pennant and a statue of a cowboy (Freddi 1934b, 8). It was a potent exchange of national symbolism.

There is no evidence that Fascists did anything during the World Cup to publicize another international feature within the Italian team itself. Four of its players who were active in the competition—Artilio De Maria, Enrico Guaita, Luisito Monti, and Raimundo Orsi—were of Argentinian origin (and this, in a tournament in which Argentina played in the first round). Their Italian family roots were used as a loophole in the Fascist law of the Carta di Viteggio against the importation of foreign players (Chirelli 1990, 99). (In fact, the regime had previously flirted with the residual patriotism of the large Italian migrant populations in the Americas.) In the 1934 final, Orsi scored the first goal, and it was Guaita who set up the ball for Schiavio to score the winner.

Another element intrinsic to the ambivalent nationalism of Italian football was language. A radio broadcast just before the 1934 final boasted that football had originated in Italy in the sixteenth century (CONI 1936, 62). Nevertheless, such nationalist reappropriation of the sport sounded awkward when juxtaposed with the preponderance of anglicisms in the press. Newspapers referred to "goals," a totally unidiomatic plural in Italian, and "corner" instead of the indigenous equivalents (e.g., *Bevilacqua 1934, 1; De Martino 1934c, 5*). Most interesting in this respect is the name of the game itself. As the winning designs show clearly (Figure 3.1) the Italian invention for football is "calcio." This did not stop some dailies from using the English word. Most striking is the appearance in the illustrated magazine *Genie Nostra*, which was described in its subtitle as *Illustrazione fascista*: the issue released on the day of the final called the championship the "Campionati del mondo di Foot-ball" (June 10, 1934, 13). All of these terms contradicted Fascist decrees to de-anglicize football terminology and gave a perhaps involuntary non-Italian gloss to the game.

In terms of sporting achievement, the celebration of nationalist triumph in an internationalist context was even more problematic, for this second World Cup was patently not a competition including all the best teams in the world. The defenders of the title, Uruguay, plagued by internal problems and still offended by the refusal of many Europeans to come in 1930, did not participate. The only Latin Americans in the tournament, Argentina and Brazil, did not send their best teams and were therefore eliminated in the first round. (Mexico had traveled to Italy only to be knocked out in a qualifier.) Coupling these defeats with the fate of the United States at the hands of Italy, *Il Giornale d'Italia* was able to announce in a headline: "All the American teams have been eliminated" (Turte 1934, 6). It was not so easy to dismiss the absence of the English team, and so intricate tirades evolved. This is how *Corriere della Sera* put it on the day before the start of the competition:

For years and years England has not been sending its teams to official tournaments. It was not at Antwerp or Paris or Amsterdam. But the results achieved by the English team recently are decisive and significant. The national team of England, defeated in Budapest, beaten in France, will have to bow to the winner of the World Cup. The "splendid isolation," as the withdrawal of the British was called, is no longer valid. Times have changed. (De Martino 1934a, 6)

To anticipate the universal value of ultimate victory, *Il Popolo d'Italia* pointed out on the day before the final that Czechoslovakia had recently beaten England 2–1 (La finale 1934, 8).

Whereas these arguments drew attention to a significant absentee, in Britain the splendid isolation was genuine. None of the British newsreel companies appear to have bought footage of the competition, and no journalists from the major newspapers were sent to cover the event. In *The Times*, the only information about the World Cup was the reproduction of an Italian postage stamp issued to commemorate the tournament (June 5, 1934, 18). Despite considerable interest in Italian politics, newspapers such as the *Daily Mail* (June 11, 1934, 18) and the *Daily Express* (June 11, 1934, 21) gave just the result of the final, in tiny notices copied from a news agency release. Although there was interest in countries such as Germany (whose team reached the semi-finals), in France the general coverage was patchy and inaccurate, especially since the national team was eliminated in the first round. (*Le Figaro* [June 11, 1934, 8], for example, limited itself to an undetailed report of the final in little over 100 words.) The propaganda value of the Italian World Cup was thus considerably reduced outside Italy.

The teams that made it through to the later stages deserved more nuanced consideration. This was necessary above all for the Spaniards, who forced Italy into a replay after a 1–1 draw in the quarter-finals. The representational strategy here was twofold: on the one hand, the Italian players were viewed as not being in top form, while on the other, Spain became a heroic combatant, a worthy adversary (e.g., Giottoli 1934a, 2). The comments after the match of the Spanish captain, Ricardo Zamora, were extensively quoted. According to Zamora, the legendary goalkeeper, nicknamed *El Divino*, "The battle in Florence was one of the most exciting sporting battles at which I have ever been present. We should have met for the final. The final in Rome will certainly not be so fine, so interesting, or so well fought" (Lomaggió 1934, 2). It also was a rather violent game, and it is relevant that Zamora, after what some consider a foul against him that led to the Italian goal (Ghirelli 1990, 136), could not return for the replay the following day, won by Italy 1–0. Even after their defeat (in another violent encounter), the Spaniards still apparently considered their foes in a fraternal light: at the train station in Florence, a fond farewell took place between Zamora and the Italian captain-goalskeeper, Giampiero Combi, who shook hands, the Spaniard declaring that his team would go and support Italy in its next match against Austria (De Martino 1934d, 6). Considering the violent nature of the two games—the first was apparently among the most savage in the history of the tournament (Martin 2004, 162)—it is difficult to believe in the authenticity of these sentiments. By the time the final was over, the "extremely fierce contest" between Italy and Spain was still being evoked (De Martino 1934e, 4).

Treatment of the Czechs followed the ploy of lauding an opposing team to enhance Italian prestige, but there also were signs of a more denigratory approach. (This was perhaps stimulated by the infamously violent encounters between Juventus and Slavia Prague in 1932 [Martin 2004, 177–79]). The free kick that resulted in the goal putting Czechoslovakia into a 2–1 lead against

Germany in the semi-final was seen as uncertain, and at least one report actually claimed that it was a mistaken decision made by the Italian referee, Rinaldo Barlassina (Giottoli 1934b, 9). The Czechs moved ahead to win by 3–1, but maybe Barlassina, one of the best-known referees in Italian history, was helping to force the weaker squad into the final against Italy (where a non-Italian referee would have to preside). Off the field, there were other insinuations about a country whose politics can hardly have been seen as sympathetic to the Fascist cause. A rather cruel caricature of the Czech president, Tomáš Masaryk, appeared on the front page of *Il Popolo d'Italia* two days before the final (June 8, 1934) and on the day of the match itself came the prominent news that Czechoslovakia was resuming "diplomatic relations with Moscow" (Praga 1934, 10). It was just as well that an adversary with such communist connections was defeated (although it was at this juncture convenient to forget the pact of friendship Mussolini had signed with the Soviet Union one year earlier).

The presentation of Nazi Germany, in contrast, involved no such problems. After the semi-final against the Czechs, Germany beat Austria 3–2 in the play-off to win third place, which granted the Germans a prominent position along with the Czechs and Italians in the closing ceremony just after the final. Their flag was one of the three flying in the stadium, and the German national anthem was heard third after that of the others. Germans in the crowd sang along and raised their arm in the Nazi salute. The German captain went up to the VIP stand to receive the corresponding prize for his team, given by Mussolini himself (Lazotti 1934c, 7; Giottoli 1934d, 9). The diplomatic approximation between Germany and Italy would be magnified four days later, when Hitler came to meet the Duce for the first time, near Venice.

The ceremonies following the Italian victory possessed other features that mixed Fascist appropriation with the veneer of international approval. When the captains of the three teams went down onto the playing field to join their fellow players, the Fascist anthem, "Giovinezza," was played, and the crowd stood up and faced Mussolini, who acknowledged the gesture and smiled. This personal touch was continued in the reward for Combi's squad: as well as the Jules Rimet trophy of FIFA, the winning team received a specially designed Duce cup six times the size of the FIFA trophy, a signed photograph of Mussolini and a gold medal in recognition of their conquest of the football world in the name of Mussolini and Fascism (Martin 2004, 189). Advantage was taken of a good photo opportunity in Mussolini's personal headquarters, the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, where he posed with the team just after the match, the presence of the Swedish referee for the game—Ivan Eklind—seemingly objectifying the sporting achievement (Cascioli 1982, 112).¹ No wonder *Il Popolo d'Italia* confidently heralded the excellent impression that had been made on foreign visitors by Fascist efficiency, which would all serve for the foreigners who would come to Italy for the 1940 Olympics (Freddi 1934f, 8). (This proved over-optimistic, although Italy was later promised the 1944 games.)

A SUBDUED SUCCESS

It is legitimate to ask whether there was any opposition to the use made by the regime of the tournament and the ultimate victory within it. The evidence is necessarily anecdotal, but one fan has since claimed that he was against the national team in 1934 because, as he put it, "I was against the regime." Trusted friends would express satisfaction to each other when opposing teams scored (Mannucci 2002, 40), yet this could never have been extensively organized as an opposition movement. The clandestine Communist Party newspaper, *L'Unità*, devoted no attention to sport at the time, but contained the following instructions in an issue published during the year of the World Cup: "Every comrade should be registered in a mass organization (union, Dopolavoro, etc.), because this is the only way the party has of linking up with these organizations" (*L'Unità*, 1934, 11, no. 14). Indeed, since 1931, it had been Communist Party policy not to boycott Fascist mass organizations, but to infiltrate them and win their members over to anti-Fascist positions (Forgas 1986, 45). Since 1934 had been the year in which 99.8 percent of the population voted for the Fascist regime in a plebiscite, it is extremely difficult to see how such positions could be articulated, especially in the realm of spectator sport. More research needs to be undertaken into the crowd dynamics of the time and the songs, slogans, and chants that may have served as vehicles of opposition.

However, there still remains the question of the extent to which the 1934 World Cup was a Fascist event, beyond simply being labeled one because it took place under the aegis of the Fascist regime. Despite military glosses and the trip of the Argentine squad to the tomb of Mussolini's family (Martin 2004, 187), the competition had few of the visits and rituals that took place eight years later, when a Spanish team (representing the Fascist sympathies of the new dictatorship in their homeland) played Italy in Milan; the Spaniards were toured to sites that were important in the early stages of the Fascist movement, and they placed wreaths at memorials to the dead. The match itself was interrupted for a minute of silence for those who had died in military combat (London 1996, 241-42).

Nor could the World Cup compare with the mass events within Italy that were national (not international) in nature. Four months after the conclusion of the World Cup, ideology and athleticism converged in Rome on October 28, 1934, when the twelfth anniversary of the March on Rome—a hugely important date in the "liturgical" calendar of the Fascist civic religion (Gentile 1996)—was celebrated with a choreographed, mass parade in the Circus Maximus, in the Duce's presence, of 12,000 athletes, including footballers and Olympic heroes. In a speech, Mussolini made overt connections between the virility of a new Italian race, its role in "every battle," and the duty of Italian

athletes "beyond our borders" (Pennacchia 1999, vol. 1, 172; Fabrizio 1976, 150-51). This kind of grandeur and direct (rather than journalistic) rhetoric had not had a central place in the events of the World Cup.

A few foreign visitors combined their match attendance with visits to the exhibition of the Fascist Revolution (*La Tribuna*, June 9, 1934, 1), although there seems to have been no mass-scale, concerted effort to coordinate such activities. Even in the realm of sport, football did not dominate public interest on every day of the tournament: the cycling competition—the Giro d'Italia—and the Davis Cup were given plenty of space in the sports pages of newspapers. In the weekly *Gente Nostra*, published on the day of the World Cup final (June 10, 1934, 13), out of ten sports photographs only three were from the football tournament. One was on boxing, and six detailed the first Italian car rally. More striking still is the fact that Fascist Party Secretary Starace is shown in the boxing and car rally photographs but is absent from the soccer images.

Maybe the World Cup did not fit comfortably with the popular participatory notions of the OND, which was prohibited from promoting competitive soccer (the realm of the CONI). Maybe it was at this stage simply too difficult to fascisticize an international competition which, in contrast to the Olympic Games, relied so heavily on the playing of the sport in question and the results of each match. In any case, the undeniable propaganda successes of the 1934 World Cup have remained strangely subdued. Despite the insistence by football specialists (cited at the beginning of this chapter) on the Fascist nature of the event, it has stayed out of historical accounts of Fascism, even those concerned with the influence of the regime on popular culture and social ritual (De Grazia 1981; Falasca-Zamponi 1997; Forgas 1990; Gentile 1996; Thompson 1991).² Although further analysis is needed to define the precise political character of the event, it undoubtedly provides a fascinating example of the way Fascist Italy was portrayed, both in an international and a domestic environment. The very uncertainties that emerge from an analysis of the tournament make it a symptomatic moment in the history of the regime.

NOTES

1. In fact eyewitness accounts accuse Eklind of taking bribes from Mussolini to favor Italy in both the semi-final (against Austria) and the final. In the semi-final he apparently moved the ball in the direction of the Italians at one point and, in the final, he ignored Italian foul play (Hughes 2003).
2. The one well-known study that does devote a sentence to the subject explains how the national team won the "World Championship in both 1937 [sic] and 1938" (Tannenbaum 1973, 145).

REFERENCES

(All unauthored references are listed under their titles according to the alphabetical order of the first word.)

- Argentieri, Mino. 1979. *L'occhio del regime: Informazione e propaganda nel cinema del fascismo*. Florence: Vallecchi.
- Beck, Peter J. 2001. For world footballing honors: England versus Italy, 1933, 1934, and 1939. In *Europe, Sport, World: Shaping Global Societies*, ed. J. A. Mangan. London: Frank Cass.
- Berezin, Mabel. 1997. *Making the Fascist self: The political culture of Interwar Italy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bevilacqua, Giuseppe. 1934. Le semifinali del campionato mondiale di calcio: Italia batte Austria per 1 a 0 e si qualifica per la finalissima della coppa del mondo. *La Tribuna*, June 5, p. 1.
- Brera, Gianni. 1975. *Storia critica del calcio italiano*. Milan: Bompiani.
- Cannistraro, Philip V. 1975. *La fabbrica del consenso: Fascismo e mass-media*. Bari: Laterza.
- Cante, Diego. 1996. Propaganda e sport negli anni 30: Gli incontri di calcio tra Italia e Austria. *Italia contemporanea* 204 (September): 521-44.
- Cascioli, Lino. 1982. *Storia fotografica del calcio italiano: Dalle origini al campionato del mondo 1982*. Rome: Newton Compton.
- Castellana, Lorenzo. 1991. *La lingua dello sport in Italia è ancora fascista*. Manduria: Piero Lacaita.
- CONI, ed. 1936. *Cronache radiofoniche dello sport*. Rome: CONI-EIAR.
- Crouch, Terry. 2002. *The World Cup: The complete history*. London: Aurum.
- De Grazia, Victoria. 1981. *The culture of consent: Mass organization of leisure in Fascist Italy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Martino, Emilio. 1934a. Si accende domani su otto fronti diversi la battaglia per il campionato del mondo. *Corriere della Sera*, May 26, p. 6.
- . 1934b. Il campionato del mondo di calcio: Primi bilanci. *Corriere della Sera*, May 29, p. 4.
- . 1934c. Cento minuti di attacco. *Corriere della Sera*, June 1, p. 5.
- . 1934d. Penultima tappa. *Corriere della Sera*, June 3, p. 6.
- . 1934e. Il compiacimento del Duce per il grandioso successo dei calciatori italiani. *Corriere della Sera*, June 12, p. 4.
- Dogliani, Patrizia. 2000. Sport and Fascism. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 5: 326-43.
- Fabrizio, Felice. 1976. *Sport e fascismo: La politica sportiva del regime 1924-1936*. Rimini: Guaraldi.

- Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta. 1997. *Fascist spectacle: The aesthetics of power in Mussolini's Italy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Foot, John. 2006. *Calcio: A cultural history of Italian football*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Forgacs, David. 1986. The Left and Fascism: Problems of definition and strategy. In *Rethinking Italian Fascism: Capitalism, populism, and culture*, ed. David Forgacs. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- . 1990. *Italian culture in the industrial era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Freddi, Luigi. 1934a. Il campionato mondiale di calcio: L'organizzazione del grande avvenimento in un'intervista con il generale Vaccaro. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, May 26, p. 8.
- . 1934b. Trentamila persone assistono alla strepitosa vittoria degli azzurri nel primo ottavo di finale. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, May 29, p. 8.
- . 1934c. La lotta tra azzurri e granata: Filo da torcere. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, June 1, p. 8.
- . 1934d. L'Italia vince la Spagna per 1-0. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, June 2, p. 8.
- . 1934e. Alla presenza del Duce la Cecoslovacchia, battendo la Germania per 3 a 1, si qualifica avversaria degli azzurri per la finale. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, June 5, p. 8.
- . 1934f. Nel nome e alla presenza del Duce i calciatori azzurri conquistano un nuovo primato mondiale. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, June 12, p. 8.
- Gentile, Emilio. 1984. The problem of the party in Italian Fascism. *Journal of Contemporary History* 19: 251-74.
- . 1996. *The sacralization of politics in Fascist Italy*. Translated by Keith Botsford. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ghirelli, Antonio. 1990. *Storia del calcio in Italia*. Rev. ed. Turin: Einaudi.
- Giottoli, Agostino. 1934a. I "quarti di finale" del campionato di calcio: L'incontro ad oltranza tra l'Italia e la Spagna per l'ammissione alle semifinali di domenica. *La Tribuna*, June 2, pp. 1-2.
- . 1934b. La "Coppa del mondo" allo Stadio del P.N.F: Alla presenza del Duce la Cecoslovacchia batte la Germania per 3 a 1 ed acquista il diritto di disputare la finale con l'Italia. *La Tribuna*, June 5, p. 9.
- . 1934c. Impresa degna di combattenti di razza. *La Tribuna*, June 12, p. 1.
- . 1934d. La cronaca dei centoventi minuti dell'appassionante "finalissima" del campionato mondiale. *La Tribuna*, June 12, p. 9.
- Glanville, Brian. 1980. *The history of the World Cup*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Godsell, Andrew. 1990. *The World Cup*. Alton: Nimrod.
- Gori, Gigliola. 2000. The model of masculinity: Mussolini, the "New Italian" of the Fascist era. In *Superman supreme: Fascist body as political icon, global fascism*, ed. J. A. Mangan. London: Frank Cass.

- Ormezzano, Gian Paolo, and B. Colombero. 1978. *Il calcio e la coppa del mondo*. Milan: Longanesi.
- Panico, Guido, and Antonio Papa. 1993–2000. *Storia sociale del calcio in Italia*. 2 vols. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Pennacchia, Mario. 1999. *Il calcio in Italia*. 2 vols. Turin: UTET.
- 50,000 persone acclamano il Duce nello Stadio del Partito consacrando la conquista italiana del campionato mondiale di calcio. 1934. *Il Giornale d'Italia*, June 12, p. 1.
- Pinkus, Karen. 1995. *Bodily regimes: Italian advertising under Fascism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Pivato, Stefano. 1994. *L'era dello sport*. Florence: Giunti.
- Praga e Bucarest riallacciano le relazioni diplomatiche con Mosca. 1934. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, June 10, p. 10.
- Recanatesi, Franco. 1978. *Il mondo è un pallone: Storia e attualità dei campionati mondiali di calcio*. Milan: Mazzotta.
- Richeri, Giuseppe. 1980. Italian broadcasting and Fascism 1924–1937. *Media, Culture, and Society* 2: 49–56.
- Rossi, Laura. 2002. Un fisico bestiale. *Il manifesto*, April 25, http://www.ilmantifesto.it/25aprile/02_25Aprile/9502rs28.01.htm (accessed May 3, 2005).
- Shirley, Simon, and Susannah Wight, eds. 2002. *The World Cup: A definitive history and guide*. London: Janus.
- Tannenbaum, Edward. 1973. *Fascism in Italian society and culture 1922–1945*. London: Allen Lane.
- Taja, Angela. 1998. Italian sport and international relations. In *Sport and international politics*, ed. P. Arnaud and J. Riordan. London: E & FN Spon.
- Thompson, Doug. 1991. *State control in Fascist Italy: Culture and conformity 1925–1943*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Tomlinson, Alan. 2005. Olympic survivals: The Olympic Games as a global phenomenon. In *The global politics of sport: The role of global institutions in sport*, ed. Lincoln Allison. London: Routledge.
- Tutte le squadre americane sono state eliminate. 1934. *Il Giornale d'Italia*, May 29, p. 6.
- Valentini, Sergio. 2002. Vittorio Pozzo, lo strano leader. *L'Europeo* (April–June): 32–3.
- Vigarillo, G. 1990. Les Premières Coupes du monde, ou l'installation du sport moderne. *Vingtième siècle* (April–June): 5–10.
- Volontà di primato. 1934. *La Tribuna*, June 12, p. 1.
- Wagstaff, Chris. 1984. The Italian cinema during the Fascist régime. *The Italianist* 4: 160–74.

- Hughes, Sean, dir. 2003. *Football and fascism* (documentary television program). Great Britain: BBC4.
- Il successo finanziario del torneo e la maturità sportiva delle folle italiane. 1934. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, May 30, p. 8.
- Ingils, Simon. 1990. *The football grounds of Europe*. London: Willow Books.
- La finale del campionato mondiale di calcio: La grande attesa per l'incontro Italia-Cecoslovacchia. 1934. *Il Popolo d'Italia*, June 9, p. 8.
- Lanfranchi, Pierre. 1991. Bologna: "The team that shook the world." *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 8: 336–46.
- Lazotti, Umberto. 1934a. Il prologo delle finali del campionato calcistico del mondo. *Il Giornale d'Italia*, May 26, p. 6.
- . 1934b. Con la "finalissima" di domani fra l'Italia ed la Cecoslovacchia si concluderà a Roma, nello Stadio del Partito, il campionato mondiale di calcio. *Il Giornale d'Italia*, June 10, pp. 1, 8.
- . 1934c. L'appassionante contesa allo stadio. *Il Giornale d'Italia*, June 12, p. 7.

- Lomaggiò di Zamora agli azzurri. 1934. *La Tribuna*, June 2, p. 2.
- London, John. 1996. Competing together in fascist Europe: Sport in early Francoism. In *Fascism and theatre: Comparative studies on the aesthetics and politics of performance in Europe, 1925–1945*, ed. Günter Berghaus. Oxford: Bergahn.
- Malvano, Laura. 1984. Il mito della giovinezza attraverso l'immaginario: Il fascismo italiano. In *Storia del giovane: II: L'età contemporanea*, ed. G. Levi and J.-C. Schmitt. Bari: Laterza.
- Mancini, Elaine. 1985. *Struggles of the Italian film industry during fascism, 1930–1935*. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
- Mannucci, Enrico. 2002. Quel calci a villa Torlonia: Intervista a Manlio Cancogni. *L'Europeo* (April–June): 38–40.
- Martin, Simon. 2004. *Football and Fascism: The national game under Mussolini*. Oxford: Berg.
- McCarthy, Patrick. 2000. Two Fascist champions. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 5: 343–45.
- Milza, Pierre. 1990. Le Football italien: Une histoire à l'échelle du siècle. *Vingtième siècle* (April–June): 49–58.
- . 1999. *Mussolini*. Paris: Fayard.
- Monticone, Alberto. 1978. *Il fascismo al microfono: Radio e politica in Italia (1924–1945)*. Rome: Studium.
- Mosse, George L. 1996. *The image of man: The creation of modern masculinity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Murray, William J. 1994. *Football: A history of the world game*. Aldershot: Scolar Press.